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Abstract 
 Emotions are influential in determining individuals to donate to charitable causes. 
However, emotions could interfere with the later decision to whom to allocate the donation 
resources by making people more likely to donate to a few individual victims instead of many 
statistical ones. Nevertheless, rationality could direct the allocation decision on the right way 
(i.e., by donating to statistical victims instead of determined victims). This paper investigated 
the role of emotional vs. deliberative information processing mode in decision-making in 
helping situations. In two studies, it was examined whether information processing mode 
(either emotional or rational) influenced participants' donation decisions. Information 
processing was manipulated by using both a mindset and conceptual prime (Study 1) or only 
a mindset prime (Study 2). The results yielded, similarly to Dickert, Sagara, and Slovic 
(2011), that an emotional processing mode increased people's tendency to donate to charity 
and also the amount donated (Study 1; Step 1). Furthermore, a rational processing mode 
determined people to choose the most normatively correct (i.e., from an utilitarian point of 
view) alternative, that is, to allocate the donation to a greater number of statistical victims 
instead of a lesser number of determined victims (Study 2; Step 2). The potential beneficial 
and disruptive implications for both emotions and rationality are discussed in line of a more 
complete two-step model of donating decisions, where Step 1 refers to the decision to donate 
or not donate and how much and Step 2 involves the decision to whom to allocate the 
donations.  
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Emotion vs. deliberation in helping: a two-step model of donating decisions 
 Helping others can take innumerable shapes, from donating to charity to helping a 
complete stranger (for example, rescuing somebody from a fire; Latané & Darley, 1970) and 
originates from many types of motivations, from ingrained empathy to a deliberately planned 
need for social recognition (Anik, Aknin, Norton, & Dunn, 2009). 
 One typical way of helping, by showing care for other people, is through giving 
financial donations for charitable purposes (Singer, 1972, 2009; Slovic, 2007). In this case, 
allocating one's resources to other people in need involves deciding whom to allocate those 
resources to, but also how much to donate. Deciding about these issues often implies difficult 
concessions (Li, Vietri, Galvani & Chapman, 2010; Unger, 1996), which can refer to how to 
use the money (e.g., either donating it or using it for themselves; Rubaltelli & Agnoli, 2011), 
but also how to choose among different recipients or charities and humanitarian causes 
(Soyer & Hogarth, 2011). 
 In helping decisions, most of the times, our intuitions and affective reactions serve as 
a basis for why we choose to help other people in need (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002), but also how much we are willing to donate (Dickert, 
et al., 2011). In accordance, Dickert et al. (2011) proposed a two-stage outlook on donating 
decisions: the first stage including the decision on whether to donate or not and the second 
stage including the decision on how much to donate. Their results concluded that emotional 
reactions determined individuals' donation in both stages.  
 However, the same emotional basis could act against us when making a decision, in 
the sense that, when confronted with the choice regarding whom to allocate the donation to, 
emotional reactions lead people to opt for a less than optimal decision. For example, Small 
and Loewenstein (2003) stated that people are more sympathetic towards and moved by an 
identified victim (or also labeled as ''determined'') and they are more likely to donate more 
resources to that victim instead of many statistical ones. A real-life example of this could be 
the case of  ''Baby Jessica'', an 18-month-old girl who fell in a well in 1987. This misfortunate 
news triggered a great outflow of sympathy and determined people to donate thousands of 
American dollars in supporting Jessica and the many volunteers involved in the rescuing 
program (Belkin, 1995). Even though the flood of kindness towards such an identified victim 
as baby Jessica was remarkable, this massive amount of donation happened at the same time 
when other millions of other unidentified children were (and still are at present) predicted to 
die annually from sources that were less costly to cure (Cryder, Loewenstein, & Scheines, 
2013; UNICEF, 2009). Despite the fact that Jessica was finally saved, if the amount of 
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donations that were given to Jessica had been instead given to programs that were supporting 
statistical victims, there would have been many more people whose lives could have been 
saved (Loewenstein & Small, 2007). This begs the question of why people choose to donate 
to a single identified victim (or to a relative smaller number of determined victims) instead of 
many statistical ones. One explanation for this could reside in the proportion dominance 
effect (PDE; Slovic et al., 2002). PDE or the ''drop-in-the-bucket'' effect is the tendency to 
favor relative savings over absolute ones (Bartels & Burnett, 2011). For example, if people 
were to choose between helping victims from a smaller group (e.g., 15 out of a total group of 
20 victims) and victims from a larger group (e.g., 15 victims out a total group of 200), most 
of the time, they choose the first alternative, even though the number of saved victims is 
exactly the same. If connected to moral judgments, PDE follows a pattern that contradicts a 
utilitarian reasoning (Bartels & Burnett, 2011). For example, Unger (1996) posited that 
people feel less morally obligated to save fewer lives amongst a great number of lives to be 
saved (the drop-in-the-bucket effect). If so, why do people prefer relative savings to absolute 
ones? It might be possible that the answer lies in the never ending debate between deontology 
and utilitarianism.  
 
Deontology and utilitarianism in helping 
 Deontology and utilitarianism are two contrasting philosophical stances that are 
underlied by distinct bases for assessing the moral condition of acts and they both entail 
different cognitive processes (Bartels, 2008). Utilitarianism (or ''consequentialism'') stipulates 
that moral judgments should be made in such a way that they are supporting the ''greater 
good'' (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Mill, 1998) in the sense that one 
decides to choose the alternative that benefits the highest number of individuals (Bartels & 
Burnett, 2011), while deontology promotes the view that certain moral rules should not be 
broken, irrespective of how much greater good would otherwise be obtained (Kant, 1959). 
For example, a deontologist would agree that killing one person in order to rescue several 
more other people is morally wrong, even if this would optimize the good outcomes (Kagan, 
1998). Accordingly, it might be very possible that deontology could stand as an explanation 
for why so many monetary resources were allocated to baby Jessica instead of other causes 
that could have used those resources more effectively (i.e., by helping a greater number of 
people in need, which is the utilitarian point of view). This could very well be that people 
might not estimate the number of lives that are saved when they choose to donate to an 
identified/determined victim instead of many statistical ones (Bartels, 2008).  
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 Furthermore, there is empirical evidence suggesting that utilitarian judgments are 
underlied by cognitive mechanisms, whereas deontological judgments are based upon 
emotional mechanisms (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene et 
al., 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Furthermore, Greene 
(2008) argues, based on empirical evidence, that deontological arguments are directed by 
emotions and that deontology, rather than involving moral reasoning is more of a moral 
justification, whereas utilitarian arguments originate from cognitive processes and are more 
likely to be drawn in real moral reasoning. Moreover, the author claims that if these empirical 
affirmations are indeed true, deontology could be seen as being more or less disconnected 
from a normative moral philosophy. These same emotional mechanisms have also been 
proven to influence the identifiable victim effect (IVE; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b, 2007). 
IVE is the tendency to provide greater help to identified victims instead of statistical ones 
(Kogut & Ritov, 2005a; Slovic, 2007; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). For example, 
Small and Loewenstein (2003) stated that people are more sympathetic and moved by an 
identified victim and they are more biased to choose to donate more resources to that victim 
instead of many statistical ones.  
  Thus, if emotional reactions underlie the motives to choose to donate more money to 
identified/determined victims instead of statistical ones, one way to avoid this is to make 
people think in a more rational, analytical manner and be aware of the consequences of their 
options. Small et al. (2007) found that after debiasing people's sympathy towards identifiable 
victims by using deliberative thinking or by priming them to think more rationally and 
analytically, they tended to give less to the identified victims (however, not more to the 
statistical ones). It could very well be possible that what is missing in this picture is an 
utilitarian framework of the many statistical victims (i.e., by emphasizing that choosing to 
help the statistical victims provides the greater good). This is because as Greene et al. (2001) 
argue, some parts of an utilitarian judgment are generated by superseding, in a deliberate 
manner, the emotional, deontologically dependent reaction. More precisely, if individuals 
were preoccupied with a rational, analytical reasoning, their moral feelings would then be 
pulled off from their first responses and aligned with an utilitarian thinking (Hare, 1981; 
Unger, 1996). 
 In line with these findings, this project aims at explaining when it is beneficial or 
detrimental to think emotionally or rationally in helping decisions. Even though Dickert et al. 
(2011) suggested a two-stage view of donating decisions (first stage being the decision to 
help or not to help and the second stage including the decision on how much to donate), a 
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more complete two-step model of helping decisions is proposed: the decision to help or not to 
help and how much help to provide (Step 1) and the decision whom to help (whom to allocate 
the resources; Step 2). The idea is that emotions are useful in the first step, but biasing in the 
second step. Even though the research that will be presented in the following literature review 
has yielded conclusive results concerning the role emotions (or emotional processing mode) 
and deliberation (or deliberative processing mode) in these decisions, all the studies were 
conducted disparately and, to our current knowledge, no other study has examined a more 
complete model of donating decisions that includes both aforementioned donating steps. 
 
The role of emotions in decision-making in helping situations 
 Throughout history, there has been a continuing debate on whether cognitive or 
emotional mechanisms underlie decision-making, especially in fields such as moral 
judgments, with early research focusing on and emphasizing the constructing of an 
understanding of a moral principle that is based rather on reason and not on emotion (Denis, 
2008). However, recent studies have illustrated that emotional reactions play a prominent role 
in moral reasoning. Indeed, the social intuitionist model, developed by Haidt (2001), is in 
part a reaction to the early prevalence of rationalist models. Haidt proposed that moral 
reasoning occurred after a judgment was made. It is considered a social model because it 
focuses on the socio-cultural aspects of moral reasoning, rather than emphasizing individuals’ 
own ability to engage in moral reasoning. Furthermore, it is intuitionist because it states that 
moral judgments are based on automatic, rapid assessments called intuitions. Haidt argued 
that only on rare occasions were moral judgments based on rational deliberation. He also 
stated that the rational and emotional systems were temporally distant from an evolutionary 
perspective, with the rational system appearing at a much later stage in our evolution, 
coinciding with the development of language. The emotional system, which enables 
individuals to judge between good and bad behaviors among in-group members, is generally 
considered to have evolved much earlier, and likely plays a substantial part in our moral 
reasoning (Yan, 2008). Thus, if moral reasoning is an emotionally influenced process 
(Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011), this begs the question of to what extent helping decisions 
are influenced by emotional thinking. Furthermore, if helping decisions are indeed influenced 
by emotional thinking then when is it good and when it is detrimental (from an utilitarian or 
consequentialist point of view) to rely on intuitions for decision-making in helping 
situations? 
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 Deciding to help. Regarding helping decisions, emotions have been proven to be of 
great importance for helping. For example, Batson (1990, p. 339) stated that ". . . 
considerable research suggests that we are more likely to help someone in need when we 'feel 
for' that person . . . ". And there are more complex and refined emotions such as empathy, 
sympathy, compassion, sadness, pity and distress that are considered to be essential in 
increasing people's motivation to help others (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987). All these emotions fall under the category labeled as vicarious affect (Fultz, 
Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988). For example, the cost-reward model (or emergency intervention 
model; Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder & Clark, 1991; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner & 
Clark, 1981; Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969) states that the distress that arises when 
observing others in need will most likely generate aversive arousal. In order to decrease this 
aversive arousal, people will engage in helping others. Thus, it seems that distress stimulates 
helping in a way that helping is considered an effective manner to eliminate distress (e.g., 
Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). Furthermore, the empathy-altruism model 
(Batson, 1987, 1991; Batson et al., 1989; Batson & Shaw, 1991) proposes that empathic 
concern serves as a base for helping others and this could stand as a proof for the fact that 
helping is rather motivated by altruistic or selfless reasons and not by selfish ones. When 
individuals notice others in need, they respond emotionally with empathy and frequently this 
empathic response leads those individuals to help (Batson, 1991, 1998; Davis, 1994; 
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987).  Furthermore, according to Loewenstein and Small (2007), 
sympathy serves as a catalyst for individuals to help others.  
 However, even though emotional reactions could positively affect the decision to 
help, it might very well be possible that thinking deliberately could determine individuals not 
to help at all. For example, when it comes to identifiable victims, Small et al. (2007; Study 4) 
suggested that deliberation might actually diminish emotional reactions to those in need and 
decrease dependence on emotional heuristics and, in this way reducing help for individual 
victims. Nevertheless, the authors also revealed that deliberation does not result in an 
increase in helping statistical victims, thus suggesting that analytical thinking might stand as 
a determinant of not helping at all. Furthermore, by priming participants to think deliberately 
when making the helping decision, Dickert et al. (2011) discovered that they helped less 
compared to the participants primed with intuitive thinking. These findings could be 
explained through the fact that the process of deliberation is of rational nature and, whilst it 
promotes a better resource allocation, when it comes to the decision of whether to help, it is a 
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callous process, permitting individuals to restrain from offering help even for those who have 
the highest need of receiving it (Cryder et al., 2013). 
 
 Deciding whom to help. Understanding how individuals choose whom to allocate 
their helping resources is an important aspect of explaining common decision-making 
(Huber, Van Boven, McGraw, & Johnson-Graham, 2011). Furthermore, understanding the 
emotional basis of allocating helping resources is an important part of explaining how people 
choose whom to help. However, the same emotional basis that determines people to help 
could act against them when making a decision, in the sense that emotions lead people to opt 
for a less rational decision (i.e., from an utilitarian point of view, not choosing the option that 
will provide the ''greater good''). For example, Batson et al. (1995) showed that inducing 
empathy could result in allocating resources to an individual target, but with the consequence 
of decreasing the collective welfare. Furthermore, people are more sympathetic and 
concerned about an identified victim and they are also more biased to choose to donate more 
financial resources to identified victims instead of statistical ones (Small & Loewenstein, 
2003). Also, regarding the IVE, Kogut and Ritov (2005a) showed that a single victim 
described in a vivid manner (by having a name and a face) generated a higher level of distress 
than a group of vividly presented victims, but also than both a single unidentifiable victim or 
a group of unidentifiable victims. Furthermore, emotional reactions can be biasing in terms of 
money allocation decisions when they involve choosing between in-group vs. out-group 
victims. In most cases, people decide to allocate the resource to the victims that belong in the 
in-group even though out-group victims could be equally or even more deserving of their 
help. For example, Dovidio et al. (1997) discovered that students were more prone to help 
another student when they thought that he or she belonged to the in-group. Moreover, 
Hornstein (1976) suggested that when putting the focus on the sameness or shared fate 
generated a sense of community, which in turn promoted helping. Additionally, by using a 
nonconscious prime to make in-group belonginess more visible provides more support for the 
in-group effect (Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley, 2002). Lastly, when individuals are 
primed to take the victim's viewpoint, they show higher levels of altruism and also of 
altruistic conduct (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Batson et al., 2003; Coke et al., 1978). 
Oceja (2008) showed that empathy could also be detrimental sometimes, in the sense that it 
can lead to people being partial when they feel empathy towards an individual who is in need 
of help. More precisely, the results of his study showed that when people are induced to feel 
empathy compared to those who are not, they tended to decide to help the person to whom 
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they were directed to feel empathy, but at the loss of helping others in a higher need of help. 
These findings are in contradiction with the utilitarian principle, in the sense that they do not 
maximize helping utility, and can be accounted for being biased, irrational choices. 
 Nevertheless, it might be possible that emotional reactions could provide the 
necessary impulse to help, but they can misguide our helping allocation decision on a wrong 
way. On the other hand, deliberative thinking could be the factor that can bring our allocation 
decision on the right path (Loewenstein & Small, 2007). Accordingly, Kahneman (1982) 
demonstrated how deliberation superseded intuitive thinking. Regarding helping decision, 
deliberation can direct help instigated by, for example, sympathy in a more beneficial path 
(Loewenstein & Small, 2007). For example, Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004; Study 3) provided 
evidence for this claim by inducing a feeling-based thinking in one condition and, on the 
other hand, by inducing a calculation-based thinking in the other condition. The results 
yielded the fact that when individuals confide on their feelings, they helped both a single or 
four victims in an equal manner. However, when they had to rely on calculation they tended 
to provide more help to four victims instead of one (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Study 3). 
This is in line with the utilitarian point of view (i.e., maximizing utility).  
 Furthermore, Loewenstein and Small (2007) proposed that it might be possible that, 
most of the times deliberation can be based on firstly, calculating which of the victim(s) is 
more entitled to receive help (maybe basing this calculation on their perceived level of 
experienced misfortune) and secondly, appraising if the donator can actually provide the 
much needed help. However, the authors argued that, by themselves, these components of 
deliberation are only cold and detached judgments. Only by incorporating deliberation after 
the first step of emotional decision-making, could helping decisions be optimized in terms of 
allocating the resources to the most deserving target (i.e., the target with the highest need of 
being helped).    
 Thus, it appears that the manner in which information about those in need is 
processed and symbolized mentally appears to be a key factor in determining individuals' 
affective responses (Dickert et al., 2011). This mental representation and processing of 
information can be understood from a dual-processing models perspective (Evans, 2008; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
 
Dual-process models  
 Essential for the dual-process models is the differentiation between intuition and 
rationality, which tries to make a distinction between what Kahneman and Frederick (2002) 
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and Evans (2003) called System 1 and System 2. System 1 category (labeled as intuitive) 
includes those processes that are deemed to be quick, reflexive and instinctive, whereas under 
the System 2 category (labeled as reflective) fall those cognitive processes that are slow-
paced, deliberated and conscious (Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The contrasts 
and the interplays between the systems have been proven to anticipate different outcomes in 
decision-making, moral judgments, persuasion and an array of other domains (Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Greene et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986; Stanovich & West, 2000; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Furthermore, research 
has focused its attention on the supposed errors produced by System 1 and the supposed bias-
adjustment capacities elicited by System 2 (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). System 1 could 
also be insensitive to numeracy (Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Hsee 
& Rottenstreich, 2004) and it could, without difficulty, be biased by aspects that are 
ostensibly trivial such as the degree of newness, clarity, attention and social closeness 
(Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Slovic, 2007). If this type of system does not react as 
powerfully to numerous (either statistical or nonstatistical) victims, making use of this 
process in moral judgments and decision-making might prompt breaches from standard moral 
principles (e.g., Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, et al., 2002). However, 
whilst System 1 is fast and offers rapid answers to judgmental dilemmas, System 2 relies 
more on deliberation, reflection and calculation and can operate as a supervisor, by verifying 
or correcting the answers System 1 provides (Sunstein, 2005). Essentially, this means that 
emotionally-guided intuitions have supremacy (Feinberg, Willer, Antonenko, & John, 2012), 
but they can be overcomed by rigorous reasoning (Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010). In 
line with this framework, there is a reason to believe that whilst emotional thinking, with its 
rapid assessment of a situation, could serve as a determinant in helping those in need, the 
same rapid approach of a decision dilemma (i.e., deciding later on whom to help) could 
predispose people to choose the more biased of two options (i.e., conforming to the 
deontological argument of ''it is morally correct to help one single person instead of not 
helping at all''). However, deliberative thinking, with its more systematic approach on helping 
decision dilemmas could debias this emotional basis and determine people to choose the 
option with the best outcome (i.e., helping more people and thus, providing the utilitarian 
''greater good'').  
 Even though System 1 and System 2 tendencies could be viewed as individual 
differences (e.g., Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), this 
study is mainly focused on situational differences. In order to do this, one needs to 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   11	  
experimentally induce the two ways of information processing. One type of such 
manipulation is by using priming techniques (Dickert et al., 2011, Small et al., 2007). This 
study makes use of priming methods to induce either an emotional or deliberative/calculating 
processing mode.  
 
Priming and helping behavior 
 A growing body of research indicates that using different priming techniques can 
determine people to engage in behaviors that require little conscious regulation, ranging from 
cognitive performance (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998) to walking speed (Bargh, 
Chen, & Burrows, 1996) and even conformity (Epley & Gilovich, 1999).  
 Regarding priming techniques, the most used methods are conceptual and mindset 
priming (see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Conceptual priming refers to activating definite 
mental representations (e.g., personality traits, goals or even stereotypes), which in turn act as 
frameworks in which to decipher the consequent information (Higgins, 1996). Once the 
concept is activated, other concepts are linked to it and triggered by spreading activation 
(Neely, 1977). One example of this type of priming would be the usage of the word ''honest'' 
in a language test in order to make the participants perceive another person as being more 
honest (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). On the other hand, mindset priming ''activates procedural 
knowledge. What is primed is a way of thinking'' (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003, p. 
463). Thus, it concerns the unconscious spinoff of a deliberately seeked mental operation 
(Galinsky et al., 2003). For instance, Wilson and Capitman (1982) instructed their male 
participants to read a story about a ''boy-meets-girl'' and it turned out that they acted in a 
friendlier conduct and smiled more to a female target in the subsequent part of the study than 
participants in the control group. 
 Furthermore, regarding mindset priming and helping decisions, Small et al. (2007; 
Study 4), adopted either a feeling-based processing mode prime or a deliberative processing 
mode prime by asking individuals to either perform mathematical calculations or to name 
what they feel in response to certain words (e.g., ''baby''). After that, participants were asked 
to state where they wished to allocate their donation by choosing between an identified or a 
statistical victim. The results indicated that whereas priming a deliberative mode decreased 
the likelihood of donating to identified victims, however, it did not increase donations to 
statistical victims.  
 Building on Small et al.'s (2007; Study 4) study, Dickert et al. (2011; Study 1) used a 
different victim manipulation, taken from Kogut and Ritov (2005a) study which used either 
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an image of an identified victim (by name and age) or of a group of eight victims identified 
also by their name and age. Dickert et al. found an increase of the rate of participants who 
donate to charity, but also in the average donation amount in an emotional prime 
manipulation compared to a deliberative manipulation. However, even though these studies 
have shown that helping behavior schemas can be triggered through mindset priming, there is 
a need to use different priming techniques in order to induce helping. This is mostly because 
of the different ways in which conceptual and mindset priming operate. More precisely, 
conceptual priming triggers specific mental representations in one circumstance but, most of 
the times, it affects, in an unintentional and unaware manner, the subsequent task present in a 
different circumstance. On the other hand, mindset priming implies a conscious and 
intentional usage of a specific mental strategy. Furthermore, it can be more vulnerable to 
demand characteristics, but also its effects could be more powerful (Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000). 
 Thus, for Study 1, both types of priming (conceptual and mindset) have been chosen 
in order to induce either an emotional or a deliberative processing mode and to increase the 
generalizability of the findings. For Study 2, only mindset priming was used.  
 
From a two-stage process to a two-step model 
 Even though there certainly are other factors that motivate people to offer help (see 
Loewenstein & Small, 2007), the powerful relationship between emotional reactions and 
helping indicates that charitable giving is, in some ways, triggered by motives that are 
associated to feelings. More often than not, in order to study this relationship, helping is 
measured by participants' willingness to donate money to charity. Nevertheless, research has 
shown that donating decisions could be better construed in a two-stage process that includes 
two types of decisions: the first would be whether to donate or not to donate any amount of 
money and the second would be how much money to donate (Dickert et al., 2011). Research 
on choice formulation backs up this presumption showing that appraisals (for example, 
donation amount) are formulated instantaneously and not retrieved from an expert memory 
checklist (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992, 1993; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Slovic, 
1995). Furthermore, previous research displaying indication of a two-stage process model 
involving appraisals and choices for gambles (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968) showed that the 
two stages could be divided into an initial stage of deciding whether to gamble or not to 
gamble and a second and final stage that includes the decision of how much money to 
allocate for the gamble. However, despite recent models, no study has so far incorporated 
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also the decision on whom to allocate the donation to (by choosing between two or more 
recipients). Furthermore, in contrast to Dickert et al. (2011) whose two-stage outlook focused 
more on how distinct emotional processes (i.e., mood management and empathy) influence 
both stages, this study is focused on how an emotional processing mode generally 
conceptualized influenced the two stages (incorporated in the Step 1 in this model). Thus, a 
more complete model is proposed, consisting of two steps: the first step incorporates the 
elements of the aforementioned two-stage approach (the decision to help or not to help and 
how much money to donate) and the second step adding up the decision whom to allocate the 
donation to. Moreover, incorporating these decisions into a two-step model allows a more 
comprehensive approach to the question of how informational processing modes motivate 
charitable giving. 
 
The present study 
 The aim of this study is to create a different, more extended approach to the two-stage 
view, by including as a first step both the initial decision to donate and the donation amount 
(the two stages, according to Dickert et al., 2011) and having as a the second step, the 
decision whom to allocate the donation. In line with these findings, this project aims at 
explaining, within a more complete model, when it is beneficial or detrimental to think 
emotionally or rationally in helping decisions. A two-step model of helping decisions is 
proposed: the decision to help or not to help (Step 1) and the decision whom to help (whom 
to allocate the resources; Step 2). The main aim of this study is to investigate how an 
emotional processing mode influences decision-making in both steps. It is expected that in 
the first step, in a similar manner to Dickert et al. (2011; Study 1), emotional processing will 
determine people to help more often in contrast to deliberative processing. It is further 
expected that in the second step, similarly to previous studies (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 
2005b, 2007), an emotional processing mode will determine people to choose the less-than-
optimal alternative (i.e., donating to fewer determined victims instead of more statistical 
ones, thus, reducing utility). Nevertheless, in contrast to the aforementioned similar studies 
that involved concrete emotions (e.g., distress and sympathy), in Step 2, this study is more 
generally concerned about emotional processing mode per se and not about specific 
emotions. Furthermore, in the same second step, partially in line with Hsee and Rottenstreich 
(2004; Study 3), it is proposed and expected that a deliberative processing mode will 
determine people to choose the other, more optimal alternative (i.e., donating to more 
statistical victims instead of fewer determined victims) and thus proving the ''greater good''. 
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However, in contrast to their study, this current paper made use of different victim 
manipulations (i.e., in terms of number and description).  
 Furthermore, this study aims to show, within a more complete model, how we can 
take the greatest advantage out of our emotional thinking (in the first step of helping, we can 
use our emotional processing mode to make the decision to help other people) and of our 
rational thinking (in the second step, when we decide whom to allocate the help, by choosing 
in a rational, debiased manner, the solution that will have the greatest benefit, from an 
utilitarian point of view).  
 
General hypothesis 
 According to a two-step model of charitable donations including two main types of 
donation decisions (whether to donate or not and how much and secondly, whom to allocate 
the resources), it was expected, similarly to Dickert et al. (2011; Study 1) that affective 
processing would result in a greater willingness to donate money, and additionally to their 
study, deliberative processing will result in choosing the more rational (i.e., utilitarian) of two 
alternatives. 
 
Specific hypotheses 
 In accordance with the dual-process model, information processing was defined as 
being directed by emotion and deliberation. In Study 1a, information processing was 
manipulated using mindset priming and in Study 1b conceptual priming was used. However, 
in Study 2 only a mindset prime was used.  
 For Studies 1a and 1b, in accordance with Dickert et al. (2011; Study 1), it was 
hypothesized that participants primed with an emotional processing mode would help more 
often than participants primed with a deliberative processing mode. 
 Furthermore, for Study 2a and 2b, it was hypothesized that participants primed with 
an emotional processing mode will be impaired in their decision-making (within an utilitarian 
framework, by not choosing the solution that will yield the ''greatest benefit''), compared to 
participants primed with a deliberative one. More precisely, willingness to opt for a more 
irrational option will be higher in those participants primed to think emotionally. 
Additionally, it was hypothesized, partially in line with Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004; Study 
3), that participants primed with a deliberative, calculative processing mode will be willing 
more often to choose the option considered as being more rational and providing the highest 
benefit. 
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Study 1 
 This study examined the willingness to donate to charity and the donation amount 
following two types of priming procedures: mindset and conceptual. Study 1a made use of a 
mindset prime, in an attempt to conceptually replicate the findings of Dickert et al. (2011; 
Study 1), whilst Study 1b made use of a conceptual prime. Additionally, both studies were 
conducted at the same time. 
 Piloting work with 11 students preceded the study in order to test how much time did 
the questionnaire take and also, if it needed to be modified in terms of layout and question 
formulation. 
 
Study 1a 
 This study examined the willingness to donate to charity and the donation amount 
following either an emotional mindset or a rationality mindset priming procedure. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 104 Swedish-speaking students completed a pen and paper questionnaire. They were 
recruited on Lund University, Helsingborg (pertaining to Lund University) and Malmö 
University campuses. The participants were also told that in exchange for their participation, 
they would have the opportunity to win 500 Swedish kronor in a lottery. In order to be 
selected for participation, the individuals had to fulfill two criteria: firstly, they had to be 
Swedish-speaking and secondly, they were not allowed to study psychology or have studied 
psychology. The participants were randomly assigned to two groups: emotional mindset and 
rationality mindset. 
 Two participants guessed the purpose of the study and five participants did not follow 
the instructions. They were excluded from further analyses. Thus, 97 (54 women, 43 men, 
age M = 23.77, SD = 7.82) were included in the final analyses. 
 
Design 
 Participants were randomly assigned into two different types of conditions (emotion 
vs. rationality). Half of the participants were randomly assigned to receive a mindset emotion 
prime and the other half received a rational mindset prime. The resulting design was a two-
group between-subject design, with two different conditions: emotion mindset and rationality 
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mindset. The critical dependent variable was participants' amount of donation to charity. 
Additionally, I measured participants' moods and individual differences in processing 
information (intuitive vs. rational; not reported here).1 
 
Materials and procedure 
 At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned into the two 
conditions. They were provided with a pen and paper questionnaire (see Appendices A, C, E 
and F), printed on both sides. They were led to believe that the study was investigating the 
relationship between handwriting and personality, and they were also told that the 
information they provide will be completely anonymous and that they can interrupt the study 
anytime they wished to. Participants in the emotional mindset condition were instructed to 
write a story about an event in their life when they felt compassion for another being, 
whereas those in the rationality mindset condition were instructed to solve a mathematical 
test and describe how they reasoned through the solving of the test, and also how they 
reached their result. Ostensibly, this was because handwriting tasks worked best when 
participants were in an emotional or rational processing mode. Furthermore, most research 
that involves mindset priming procedures aims at having participants purposely using the 
mental process at hand (in this case either emotion or rationality) rather than exposing them 
to the concepts themselves or to other words strongly connected with the concepts themselves 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). 
 Secondly, they were instructed to wait for a minute before turning the page to 
complete a short personality test. They were explained that it was because it was ''important 
to have a little break between the parts''. However, while they were waiting to complete the 
personality items, they were encouraged to think how would they allocate the money if they 
would win 500 Swedish kronor in the lottery. They could allocate the money to three main 
categories (basic needs such as food and clothes, entertainment needs such as travelling and 
parties, and lastly, charity). Ostensibly, this was just a task to do while waiting. They were 
instructed that they could allocate the money however they wished to, for example, they 
could allocate all the money only to one category or divide (equally or unequally) the money 
between the three categories. The dependent variables of interest were participants' 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The reason why these items were included was because the participants were led to believe the study was examining the relationship 
between personality and handwriting, thus making it necessary to include personality items to support the study's cover story, otherwise they 
would have been aware of the real aim of the study.  
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willingness to donate at least some amount out of those 500 Swedish kronor to charity and 
also how much of that sum they donated. Furthermore, they also had to complete their gender 
and age. After completing those questions, they could proceed further in completing the 
manipulation check measuring participants' moods (consisting of a four 7 Likert-scale where 
1 = ''not at all'' to 7 = ''very much'') items, measuring participant's self-reported measures on 
whether they felt more bored, happy (both items being more as fillers, to distract their 
attention from guessing the hypothesis) emotional, more kind, more analytical and lastly, 
more calculating during the task, some filler questions and four personality items (two 
measuring intuitive processing mode and the other two measuring rational processing mode; 
the analyses are not reported here2) from the REI scale (Rational–Experiential Inventory; 
Pacini & Epstein, 1999) translated by Björklund and Backström (2008; see Appendix F).  
 When they completed the whole questionnaire, they were given a separate list to write 
their emails on if they wished to participate in the lottery. After that, they were asked to 
answer to two funnel debriefing questions that tested whether they were aware or suspicious 
of the priming manipulation or the purpose of the study: 1. What do you think the purpose of 
this study was?  2. Did you think that any of the tasks were related in anyway? 
a. if  ''yes'', which of the tasks and in what way were they related? (see Appendix G). Finally, 
the participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. Two participants guessed 
the purpose of the study and they were excluded from further analyses. 
 
Results 
Manipulation check  
 After the respondents completed both the handwriting task and the money allocation 
task, their moods were measured using the four 7-point Likert scale items measuring whether 
they felt more: emotional, kind, analytical and calculating and two filler questions (bored and 
happy) designed to hide the real aim of the study.  
 Results of four separate t-tests yielded that participants felt more emotional: t(93) = 
10.00, d = 2.06 in the emotion mindset condition than in the rationality mindset condition, 
but not more kind, t(93) = -.39, d = .08. Furthermore, the participants felt less analytical: 
t(94) = -3.88,  d = .79 in the emotion mindset condition than in the rationality mindset 
condition and also less calculating: t(93) = -7.11, d = 1.45. Additionally, regarding the filler 
items participants primed with emotion felt less bored, t(94) = -3.55, d = .72 than participants 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The analyses are beyond the scope of this study since the items were selected in order to support the cover story of the study (i.e., that the 
study was investigating the relationship between handwriting and personality. 
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primed with rationality and also less happy t(93) = -3.38, d = .70 (see Table 1 for means, 
standard deviations and p values). The results are in line with the expectations, since it was 
expected that people would feel more emotional in the emotional mindset condition and both 
more analytical and calculating in the rationality mindset prime condition. These results 
indicate that both the emotional and the analytical and calculating manipulations were 
effective for the mindset priming.  
 
Table 1 
Studies 1a and 1b: Means (and Standard Deviations) of the manipulation check 
  Study 1a 
(mindset 
prime) 
  Study 1b 
(conceptual 
prime) 
 
Manipulation 
check 
Emotion Rationality p Emotion Rationality p 
Emotional 4.62 (1.44) 1.80 (1.29) < .001 2.20 (1.46) 2.17 (1.21)  .891 
Kind 3.64 (1.61) 3.78 (1.78) .693 4.22 (1.64) 3.92 (1.60) .351 
Analytical 3.34 (1.52)  4.54 (1.52)  < .001 3.73 (1.82)  3.25 (1.64) .173 
Calculating 2.82 (1.39) 5.04 (1.65)  < .001 3.24 (1.90)  3.02 (1.68) .540 
Bored 2.38 (1.23) 3.48 (1.77) .001 3.51 (1.70) 3.54 (1.61) .926 
Happy 2.62 (1.44) 3.60 (1.37) .001 3.80 (1.32) 4.06 (1.36) .330 
 
Willingness to donate 
 Of the 97 participants, 54 (55%) indicated that they would donate at least some 
amount of those 500 Swedish kronor to charity.  
  A χ2-test revealed a statistically significant difference in the proportion of 
participants who donated in the emotion vs. rational condition χ2 (1, N = 97) = 4.48, p = .034. 
As expected and shown in Figure 1, participants in the emotion mindset condition (64%) 
donated more frequently than participants in the rationality mindset condition (42%).  
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Figure 1. Participants' willingness to donate in the mindset prime condition 
   
Donation amount 
 To further explore the effect of prime on the donation amount, a square root 
transformation of participants' donation amount was performed in order to reduce skewness 
and eliminate outliers. Furthermore, the means and standard deviations are reported for the 
untransformed variable. 
  An independent t-test was conducted in order to determine if participants primed with 
a compassion mindset would donate more money to charity than participants primed with a 
rationality mindset. The results were statistically significant, t(88.2) = 3.09, p = .003, d = .62, 
meaning that, indeed the participants in the compassion mindset condition donated more 
money to charity (M = 79.70, SD = 104.35) than the participants in the rationality mindset 
condition (M = 29.04, SD = 44.04).3  
 
Study 1b 
 This study was intended to replicate Study 1a, by examining the willingness to donate 
to charity and the donation amount following either an emotion conceptual or a rationality 
conceptual priming procedure. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A non-parametric method was also used to see if there were any differences in the analyses: Mann–Whitney (MW). The results of the test 
were also in the expected direction and significant, U = 815, p = .006. Participants primed with an emotion mindset had an average rank of 
56.20, while participants primed with a rationality mindset had an average rank of 41.34.  
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Method 
Participants 
 104 Swedish-speaking students completed a similar pen and paper questionnaire as in 
Study 1a with only one modification: participants in the emotion conceptual condition were 
instructed to transcribe a text that defined compassion, whereas those in the rationality 
conceptual condition were instructed to transcribe a text that defined rationality (see 
Appendices B and D). Two participants guessed the purpose of the study and five participants 
did not follow the instructions. They were excluded from further analyses. Thus, 97 (56 
women, 41 men, age M = 22.63, SD = 3.77) were included in the final analyses. 
 
Design 
 Participants were randomly assigned into two different types of conditions (emotion 
vs. rationality). Half of the participants were randomly assigned to receive an emotion 
conceptual prime and the other half received a rational conceptual prime. The resulting 
design was a two-group between-subject design, with two different conditions: emotion 
conceptual and rationality conceptual. Similar to Study 1a, the critical dependent variable 
was participants' amount of donation to charity. Additionally, similar to Study 1a, 
participants' moods and individual differences in processing information were measured 
(intuitive vs. rational; not reported here). 
 
Materials and procedure 
 The procedure was the same as in Study 1a, except that, whereas in Study 1a, 
participants were instructed to either describe an event in their lifetime when they felt 
compassion for another being or to solve a mathematical test, in Study 1b they were 
instructed to transcribe a text that defined either compassion or rationality (see Appendix B 
and D). The transcription task is, in reality, a way to make sure that the participants represent 
mentally the constructs (related to emotion or rationality) without them being aware that the 
author is interested in these constructs (Abbate, Ruggieri, & Boca, 2013). Furthermore, two 
participants guessed the purpose of the study and they were excluded from further analyses. 
 
Results 
Manipulation check  
 In a similar manner to Study 1a, participants' moods were measured using the four 7-
point Likert scale items measuring whether they felt more: emotional, kind, analytical and 
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calculating and two filler questions (bored and happy) designed to hide the real aim of the 
study. 
 Results of four separate t-tests failed to reach statistical significance (see Table 1 for p 
values). More precisely, participants did not feel more emotional in the emotion conceptual 
condition t(95) = .14, d = .02 than in the rationality conceptual condition, nor did they feel 
more kind in the emotion conceptual condition t(95) = .94, d = .18. Moreover, they did not 
feel less analytical t(95) = 1.37, d = .28 in the emotion conceptual condition compared to the 
rationality conceptual condition nor less calculating t(95) = .61, d = .12, and also nor more 
bored or happy. All the means, standard deviations and p values are presented in Table 1. 
These results indicate that neither one of the manipulations were effective for the conceptual 
priming.  
 
Willingness to donate 
 Of the 97 participants, 55 (56%) indicated that they would donate at least some 
amount of those 500 Swedish kronor to charity.  
 A χ2-test revealed a marginally significant difference in the proportion of participants 
who donated in the emotion vs. rational condition χ2 (1, N = 97) = 2.99, p = .084. Thus, as 
shown in Figure 2, participants in the emotion conceptual condition (65%) donated slightly 
more often than participants in the rationality conceptual condition (47%). 
 
Figure 2. Participants' willingness to donate in the conceptual prime condition 
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Donation amount  
 To further explore the effect of prime on the donation amount, a square root 
transformation of participants' donation amount was performed in order to reduce skewness 
and eliminate outliers. Furthermore, the means and standard deviations are reported for the 
untransformed variable. 
  An independent t-test was conducted to determine if participants primed with an 
emotion concept donated more money to charity than participants primed with a rationality 
concept. The results were marginally significant, t(95) = 1.63, p = .106, d = .33, thus, 
participants in the emotion conceptual condition donated slightly more money to charity (M = 
64.49, SD = 87.56) than participants in the rationality conceptual condition (M = 43.75, SD = 
60.69).4 
 
Discussion 
 Studies 1a and 1b made use of two types of priming manipulations (mindset and 
conceptual) to influence participants' informational processing mode. These manipulations 
were designed to prime participants with either an emotional thinking or a rational thinking 
that might, in turn, influence their decision whether to donate or not donate any amount of 
money to charity. As expected, by using a mindset prime, priming participants to focus on 
their emotional thinking lead to greater feelings of emotion and both a higher willingness to 
donate to charity and to a higher donation amount, compared to those primed to focus on 
their deliberative thinking. These are in line with the hypothesis, that an emotional processing 
mode will determine people to help more. As a result, Study 2 was conducted in order to test 
whether, when it comes to whom to allocate the help, emotional thinking can actually impair 
decision-making, but deliberation can lead individuals to opt for the most effective 
alternative.  
 Furthermore, by using a conceptual prime, the results for the Study 1b were also in 
the expected direction, but they were only marginally significant, which would imply that this 
type of priming manipulation was less strong than the mindset one and did not work 
according to the manipulation check. For this reason, only the mindset prime was chosen as 
an information processing manipulation for Study 2. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  A non-parametric method was also used to see if there are any differences in the analyses: Mann–Whitney (MW). Results of a Mann-
Whitney U did not confirm the hypothesis, that participants primed with a emotion concept would donate more money to charity, on 
average, than participants primed with a rationality concept, U = 970, p = .116. Participants primed with an emotion concept had an average 
rank of 53.19, while participants primed with a rationality concept had an average rank of 44.72.	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Study 2  
 In Study 1, two different types of priming procedures (mindset and conceptual) were 
used in order to manipulate participants' processing mode by priming them to think either 
emotionally or rationally. The primes were used to influence their decision whether to help or 
not to help (by donating a certain amount of money to charity) and their donation amount 
(i.e., how much money they were willing to donate). Study 2 made use of only a mindset 
(emotional or rational prime) and it examined choice of allocations of donation money where 
one choice helps fewer people, makes one feel good about helping, but does not provide the 
greatest benefit (i.e., the choice of donating to determined victims), whereas the other option 
helps more people (i.e., statistical victims), does not make one feel so good about helping, but 
it will provide a greater good (from an utilitarian point of view). Study 2a involved a forced 
choice of money allocation between two organizations that were supporting the intuitive 
claim or the rational claim. Study 2b involved a free choice of money allocation within the 
same organization to three different areas in the organization (namely, an area that supports 
the intuitive claim, one that supports the rational claim and another one that was merely a 
filler choice to distract participants' attention from guessing the hypothesis). Additionally, 
Study 2a and Study 2b were conducted at the same time. 
 
Study 2a 
 This study examined participants' forced choice of money allocation to two different 
organizations (one considered more of an intuitive choice and the other more of a rational 
choice) following either an emotion mindset or a rationality mindset priming procedure. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 105 Swedish-speaking students completed a pen and paper questionnaire. They were 
recruited on the Lund University campus. The participants were told that as a thank you for 
their participation, ten Swedish kronor will be donated to charity. They were explained that 
their participation in the study would "not only contribute to handwriting research, but also 
will make the world a little better". Similar to study 1, in order to be selected for 
participation, the individuals had to fulfill two criteria: firstly, they had to be Swedish-
speaking and secondly, they were not allowed to study psychology or have studied 
psychology. The participants were randomly assigned into two groups: emotion mindset and 
rationality mindset. 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   24	  
 Four participants guessed the purpose of the study and seven participants did not 
follow the instructions. They were excluded from further analyses. Thus, 94 (54 women, 40 
men, age M = 22.32, SD = 2.03) were included in the final analyses. 
 
Design 
 In this study, only a mindset prime was used. Half of the participants were randomly 
assigned to receive an emotion prime and the other half received a rational prime. The 
resulting design was a two-group between-subject design, with two different conditions: 
emotion mindset and rationality mindset. The critical dependent variable in was participants' 
choice of donating to either one of the two organizations. Additionally, similar to Study 1, 
participants' moods and individual differences in processing information (intuitive vs. 
rational; not reported here) were measured. 
 
Materials and procedure 
 At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned into the two 
conditions. They were provided with a similar pen and paper questionnaire as was used in 
Study 1a (see Appendices A, C and F). The procedure was the same as in Study 1, with only 
one difference: meanwhile they were waiting to complete the personality items, participants 
were encouraged to choose which of two organizations (the first of which it was considered 
to be more of an intuitive choice and the second one more of a rational, normatively correct 
choice) they would allocate those ten Swedish kronor to (see Appendix H). However, it 
should be mentioned that it was the author's decision to consider these two organizations of 
being either intuitive or rational. 
 The first organization, called MinStoraDag is a famous organization that aims at 
helping identified Swedish children, helping few people, but helping in a ''feeling-good'' kind 
of way. MinStoraDag was described as being a fundraising foundation that was helping 
children with serious illnesses in fulfilling their dreams (for example, singing with their idols, 
swimming with dolphins or meeting their favorite footballer). Its goal is to give these 
children ''something wonderful to dream about when the days are long and the treatments are 
harsh''. It is a more intuitive choice because the victims are identified (albeit anonymous) and 
it has been proposed that emotions regulate the IVE (Small & Loewenstein, 2003). 
Furthermore, by choosing this alternative, one can help a greater proportion of the group of 
children that suffer from serious illnesses. The second organization called 
Världsinfektionsfonden is also a known organization that is helping statistical outgroup 
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victims in a more abstract, indirect way. Världsinfektionsfonden was described as consisting 
of scientists and volunteers who were aiming at supporting research and development on 
poverty infectious diseases, but also at contributing to an increased knowledge about how 
these diseases impact poor communities. Its goal is to support the development of means and 
methods for combating infectious diseases. It is considered a normative choice, because it is 
more utilitarian since it provides ''the greatest good for the greatest number'' (Bartels, 2008, p. 
382). Furthermore, according to the dual-process models, utilitarian judgments are connected 
to deliberation (Greene et al., 2008, 2004, 2001). 
 After answering the two debriefing questions (see Appendix G), four participants 
guessed the hypothesis and were thus excluded from further analysis. Finally, the participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
 
Results 
Manipulation check  
 In a similar manner to Study 1, participants' moods were measured using the four 7-
point Likert scale items measuring whether they felt more: emotional, kind, analytical and 
calculating and two filler questions (bored and happy) designed to hide the real aim of the 
study. 
 Results of four separate t-tests yielded that participants felt more emotional: t(91) = 
8.46, d = 1.76 in the compassion mindset condition than in the rationality mindset condition, 
but not more kind, t(91) = -.26, d = .06. Furthermore, the participants felt less analytical: 
t(90.5) = -5.10,  d = 1.06 in the compassion mindset condition than in the rationality mindset 
condition, and also less calculating: t(91) = -6.12, d = 1.27. Regarding the filler items, 
participants primed with emotion felt less bored, t(90) = -3.13, d = .65 than participants 
primed with rationality. Additionally, they felt marginally less happy t(91) = -1.73, d = .36 
(see Table 2 for means, standard deviations and p values). These results indicate that both the 
emotional and the analytical and calculating manipulations were effective. 
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Table 2 
Studies 2a and 2b: Means (and Standard Deviations) of the manipulation check 
  Study 2a   Study 2b  
Manipulation 
check 
Emotion Rationality p Emotion Rationality p 
Emotional 4.40 (1.38) 2.07 (1.27) < .001 3.83 (1.54) 2.05 (1.30)  < .001 
Kind 3.99 (1.62) 4.07 (1.56) .791 3.62 (1.59) 3.68 (1.86) .867 
Analytical 2.69 (1.34)  4.11 (1.35)  < .001 3.12 (1.36)  4.27 (1.68) .001 
Calculating 2.65 (1.52) 4.60 (1.56)  < .001 2.92 (1.45)  4.63 (1.62) < .001 
Bored 2.64 (1.52) 3.60 (1.42) .002 2.57 (1.73) 3.76 (1.84) .003 
Happy 2.90 (1.63) 3.42 (1.27) .087 2.43 (1.40) 3.51 (1.47) .001 
 
  
Organization choice 
 A χ2-test revealed a statistically significant difference in the proportion of participants 
who chose MinStoraDag instead of Världsinfektionsfonden in the emotion vs. rational 
condition χ2 (1, N = 94) = 5.16, p = .023. As expected and shown in Figure 3, participants in 
the emotion mindset condition (64%) chose more frequently MinStoraDag than participants 
in the rationality mindset condition (36%). Conversely, participants in the rational mindset 
condition (60%) chose more frequently Världsinfektionsfonden than participants in the 
emotion mindset condition (40%). 
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Figure 3. Participants' choice of organizations 
 
Study 2b 
 This study examined participants' free choice of money allocation to three different 
areas of the same organization (the first area considered more of an intuitive choice, the 
second are more of a rational choice and the third one being a filler choice, to distract 
participants' attention from the real purpose of the study) following either an emotion mindset 
or a rationality mindset priming procedure. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 98 Swedish-speaking students completed a pen and paper questionnaire. They were 
recruited on the Lund University campus. Similar to the previous studies, in order to be 
selected for participation, the individuals had to fulfill two criteria: firstly, they had to be 
Swedish-speaking and secondly, they were not allowed to study psychology or have studied 
psychology. The participants were randomly assigned to two groups: emotion mindset and 
rationality mindset. 
 Three participants guessed the purpose of the study and eleven participants did not 
follow the instructions. They were excluded from further analyses. Thus, 84 participants (61 
women, 23 men, age M = 23.90, SD = 5.44) were included in the final analyses. 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   28	  
 
Design 
 Similar to Study 2a, only a mindset prime was used. Half of the participants in the 
were randomly assigned to receive an emotion prime and the other half received a rational 
prime. The resulting design was a two-group between-subject design, with two different 
conditions: emotion mindset and rationality mindset. The critical dependent variable was 
participants' donation amount to three different areas of Children Cancer Foundation they 
would like to allocate those ten Swedish kronor. 
 
Materials and procedure 
 At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned into the two 
conditions. They were provided with a similar pen and paper questionnaire as was used the 
previous studies (see Appendices A, C and F). The procedure was the same as in the previous 
studies, the only difference being that meanwhile they were waiting to complete the 
personality items, participants were instructed to choose to allocate those ten Swedish kronor 
to three different areas of a cancer foundation called Barncancerfonden (see Appendix I). 
The first area, Advice and Support (intended to be an intuitive choice, in the same manner 
and for the same reasons as was explained above with MinStoraDag) was concerned with the 
development of children cancer care to support the child and their environment after the 
treatment. This meant that the sick children could do fun activities and that the family 
received comfort and financial support. The second area, Research and Education (intended 
to be a rational choice in the same manner and for the same reasons as was explained above 
with Världsinfektionsfonden) was supporting relevant research for child cancer. Lastly, the 
third area, Information, which was intended to be a filler choice, was providing informational 
activities on child cancer with the aim of increasing the understanding of the lives of children 
suffering of cancer (see Appendix I). 
 After answering the two debriefing questions (see Appendix G), three participants 
guessed the hypothesis and they were excluded from further analysis. Finally, participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
 
Results 
Manipulation check  
 Results of four separate t-tests yielded that participants felt more emotional: t(81) = 
5.68, d = 1.25 in the compassion mindset condition than in the rationality mindset condition, 
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but not more kind, t(81) = -.17, d = .03. Furthermore, the participants felt less analytical: 
t(81) = -3.43,  d = .75 in the compassion mindset condition than in the rationality mindset 
condition and also less calculating: t(80) = -6.88, d = 1.52. Regarding the filler items, 
participants primed with emotion felt less bored, t(81) = -3.02, d = .67 than participants 
primed with rationality. Additionally, they felt less happy t(81) = -3.44, d = .75 (see Table 2 
for means, standard deviations and p values). These results indicate that both the emotional 
and the analytical and calculating manipulations were effective. 
 
Donation allocation  
 A t-test was conducted in order to determine if participants primed with an emotion 
mindset would donate more money to the Support Cancer Areas than participants primed 
with a rationality mindset. The results failed to reach statistical significance, t(82) = -.25, d = 
.06. Furthermore, a t-test was conducted to determine whether participants primed with an 
emotion mindset would donate less money to the Research Cancer Areas than participants 
primed with a rationality mindset. The results also failed to reach statistical significance, 
t(82) = .31, d = .07. Regarding the Information Cancer Areas (filler choice), results also 
failed to reach statistical significance, t(82) = -.19, d = .04 meaning that participants primed 
with emotion did not donate less money to the Information Areas than participants primed 
with rationality. The means, standard deviations and p values are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Means (and Standard Deviations) and p values for Study 2b 
Cancer 
Areas 
Emotion Rationality p 
Support 3.71 (2.80) 3.86 (2.39) .802 
Research 5.33 (2.94) 5.14 (2.70) .758 
Information .95 (1.06)  1.00 (1.23)  .850 
 
Discussion 
 Studies 2a and 2b made use of a mindset priming manipulations to influence 
participants' processing mode. These manipulations were designed to prime participants with 
either an emotional thinking or a rational thinking. which might, in turn, influence their 
decision whom to allocate the donation amount. Study 2a involved a forced choice of 
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decision allocation, participants being instructed to choose between an organization that 
supported a limited amount of determined victims (MinStoraDag) and an organization that 
supported a greater number of statistical victims (Världsinfektionsfonden). As expected, 
participants primed with an emotional mindset chose more often to donate to MinStoraDag, 
whereas participants primed with a deliberative mindset chose more often to donate to 
Världsinfektionsfonden, thus supporting the claim that emotions could determine people to 
choose to donate to fewer determined victims, whereas deliberation promotes a greater 
number of donations to more statistical victims, thus helping more people and promoting the 
greatest benefit. Study 2b examined participants' free choice of money allocation to three 
different areas of the same organization, namely Barncancerfonden: Support which also 
involved a limited amount of determined victims, Research which involved a greater number 
of statistical victims and Information which was a filler choice to distract participants from 
guessing the real purpose of the study. The results did not support the hypothesis that 
participants primed with emotional thinking would choose to donate more often to the 
Support area, nor that participants primed with deliberative thinking would choose to donate 
more often to the Research area. There were no such differences regarding donation choice, 
participants in both conditions donated in equal number to both Support and Research. 
 
General Discussion 
 Emotional processing mode is an important factor to take in consideration when it 
comes to decision-making in helping situations. Nevertheless, one of the main questions in 
this study is whether emotional thinking is beneficial or detrimental in helping. In the current 
paper, it was found that emotional thinking came in aid for deciding whether to help or not to 
help, but impaired the decision on whom to allocate the helping resources to.  
 In two studies, the function of processing mode on individuals' donation decisions 
was investigated. Processing mode was conceptualized according to the dual-process models 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Evans, 2008), which divides and differentiates information 
processing into two main mechanisms: emotion and rationality.  
 In Study 1a, information processing was manipulated by priming participants with 
either an emotional or rational processing mode (by using a mindset priming technique) after 
which they were instructed to decide whether they wished to allocate a certain sum of money 
to charity and to specify how much. Taken together, the findings of this study indicate that an 
emotional processing mode results in a greater willingness to donate to charity, but also in a 
higher amount of donation, compared to a rational processing mode. The results are in line 
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with previous research (Dickert et al., 2011) pointing out that participants primed with 
intuitive thinking helped more than those primed with deliberative thinking. However, this 
study has a critical difference compared to Dickert et al. (2011) study, whose results pointed 
out that, in fact, there were different emotional mechanisms that guided willingness to donate 
and amount of money donated. More precisely, mood management was accountable for 
participants' donate/not donate decision, whereas feelings of empathy predicted donation 
amount. The main interest in this project was if an emotional processing mode per se would 
be predictive of both willingness to donate and how much to donate and the results were in 
the expected direction. More precisely, whether it was for selfish or altruistic motives, an 
emotional processing mode increased individuals' willingness to donate to charity, but also 
their amount of money that were donated.  
  Furthermore, the results also indicate that a more rational, deliberative processing 
mode has a detrimental impact on donations, in the sense that it reduces helping compared to 
emotional processing (Dickert et al., 2011; Small et al., 2007). One explanation for this 
would be the fact that it might be possible that a deliberative mode of processing might 
influence people to direct their attention on other cues when they evaluate whether they 
should donate or not and how much (Dickert et al., 2011). 
 Study 1b made use of a conceptual priming, to induce either an emotional or a 
deliberative processing mode. However, even though the manipulation check did not work as 
expected (i.e., participants did not feel more emotional nor more rational and analytical) the 
results were marginally significant in the expected direction (i.e., participants in the 
emotional condition donated more to charity than those in the rational/deliberative condition). 
Even though the results are unexpected, an explanation for this could be that the conceptual 
prime task (i.e., transcribing either a definition of compassion or of rationality; see 
Appendices B and D) did not make the participants engaged enough in the task, or that the 
number of times the words ''compassion'' or ''rationality'' would not have been enough to 
activate either of these concepts. If either of these two words had appeared more often in the 
text, participants would have been more exposed to either the emotional or rational concept 
and these concepts would have been more powerfully activated (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 
1982) which might then account for their donation/no-donation choice. However, it might 
very well have been that the concepts were indeed activated, but it could have been just an 
issue of mnemonic duration. More precisely, in conceptual priming, when the concepts are 
activated, the activation in memory should be carried on for different tasks than those that 
explicitly involved the concepts of matter (Bargh, 1994; Higgins & King, 1981). For this 
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reason, it might have been possible that the activation lingered in participants' memory 
enough to influence their donation/no-donation choice, but not long enough to have an effect 
on the manipulation check, since the manipulation check items appeared after the donation 
choice (see Appendix F). 
 All in all, regarding Study 1, an explanation for such results would be the fact that 
both types of priming manipulations (mindset and conceptual) were designed in such a way 
that the writing task was presented as not being at all connected with the donate/not donate 
choice (see Appendix E). Thus, it may appear that the processing modes induced were more 
easily transferred from the initial writing task to the choice at hand. In contrast, if the priming 
manipulation had been presented more in connection to the donation/no donation choice, it 
could have been possible that it would have had no whatsoever effect on giving if, for 
example, the the first reaction of a cause would have been emotionally charged and 
interfering with the deliberative prime. More precisely, for instance, if the donation/no-
donation choice had been aimed at supporting a certain cause (e.g., by presenting a charity 
letter), then it could have been that the first reaction to the cause might have been emotionally 
persuasive and inflexible (Small et al., 2007) for the participants primed with rationality. 
However, the donation choice was framed in a way that it was mixed with other two 
alternatives (participants perceiving it more as filler) and aimed at donating to charity in 
general (see Appendix E). 
 Furthermore, the results support the view that informational processing mode has an 
important part in philanthropy (Dickert et al., 2011). Further evidence for this view was 
brought in Study 2 where information processing was manipulated by priming participants 
with either an emotional or a rational mindset procedure followed by instructing them to 
choose between two main alternatives that were conceptualized as either being of an 
intuitive, less effective choice (i.e., helping a small amount of determined victims) or of an 
rational, utilitarian choice (i.e., helping a greater amount of statistical victims).  
 In Study 2a, participants had to choose one of two alternatives (intuitive vs. rational) 
to allocate their donation to. The results confirmed the hypothesis, that participants primed 
with emotion were more likely chose more often the more intuitive choice (the organization 
MinStoraDag that aimed at helping a lesser number of determined victims), and that 
participants primed with rationality more likely chose more often the more rational choice 
(the organization Världsinfektionsfonden that aimed at helping a greater number of statistical 
victims). These results are partially in line with previous research (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 
2005b, 2007), in the sense that emotional reactions underlie the decision to donate to 
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identified (in this case, determined) victims. However, the main difference in this study was 
in its focus: it aimed at investigating the role of affective processing mode and not of 
emotions. Furthermore, the results are also slightly in line with the findings of Hsee and 
Rottenstreich (2004; Study 3) in the sense that when participants were presented with a more 
abstract image (i.e., the victims being represented by dots instead of pictures) they tended to 
provide more help to more victims described in a statistical, less vivid manner instead of 
helping only one victim described in the same manner. However, one difference with the 
current study is that the authors did not make use of priming, but instead only of the manner 
in which the victims were presented. Moreover, their presentation of the victims (i.e., either 
using dots or pictures and having an exact number of victims) differed from the description 
used in this study (i.e., by giving information on how the organizations differed in goals and 
functions in supporting the charitable causes).  
 In Study 2b, participants were instructed to freely allocate their donations to three 
different areas of the same organization (Barncancerfonden), the first of which (Support) was 
also aiming at helping determined victims, the second (Research) was aiming at helping 
statistical victims and the third one (Information) was a filler area of choice aimed at 
diverting participants' awareness of the real purpose of the study (see Appendix I). The 
results, however, did not confirm the hypothesis, that participants primed with emotion will 
more likely choose to donate more often and more money to the first area, nor that 
participants primed with deliberation will more likely choose to donate more often and more 
money to the second area. One explanation for this might be the fact that the choices 
participants were instructed to make involved different areas of the same organization, not 
different organizations, so it might be possible that participants felt that they were helping the 
organization overall by choosing either of the areas. More precisely, since the organization 
had the overall aim at helping children with cancer, it might have been possible that the 
participants did not see very clear that the different areas were aiming at helping the children 
in different ways (i.e., in an intuitive, feeling-good kind of way by providing support or in a 
rational, deliberate kind of way by providing research for child cancer). Moreover, it could 
have also been on issue of message framing. As such, it might very well have been that the 
main choices in Study 2b were both framed in an equally vivid manner (i.e., by emphasizing 
that the recipients were the same child victims suffering from cancer).  
 
Emotional valence and message framing 
 It should also be argued that the emotional prime manipulation was not intended to be 
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of a certain valence (i.e., either positive or negative), but it was aimed at merely inducing 
participants with an intuitive processing mode. Similarly to Dickert et al. (2011) study, it was 
not intended to induce either a positive or a negative mood since most research findings 
regarding mood and helping behavior are quite intricate because research has shown that both 
positive and negative moods are connected to helping. Either for keeping their good mood up 
or for getting rid of their bad mood, people engage in helping behaviors as a consequence. 
For example, people in a happy mood state would offer support just because making another 
person feel happy would preserve their own positive mood (Lamy, Fischer-Lokou, & 
Guéguen, 2012). Additionally, individuals in a good mood are more likely to think of and 
appraise more positively their current experiences. As a result of that, they could also assess 
in a more positive manner a helping appeal, particularly the valuation of helping (Isen, 
Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). Thus, irregardless of the valence of the induced mood, it was 
intended to examine whether an emotional processing mode per se could determine people to 
help more and the results were in the expected direction.  
 However, it should be pointed out that the manipulation check results from Study 1a 
and Study 2 yielded that participants primed with rationality felt happier that participants 
primed with emotion. One account for this would be that the in emotional mindset prime 
participants were instructed to describe an event in their lives when they felt compassion for 
another being, which might have induced them with a negative mood. Although is still 
debatable whether the emotion of compassion can be of a certain valence (e.g., Lazarus, 
1991), and although compassion is usually defined as being a pleasant, positive emotion 
(Keltner & Lerner, 2010; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987) compassion can also 
sometimes be unpleasant (Condon, & Feldman Barrett, 2013). For example, by presenting 
people with images of poverty-stricken people or of defenseless children experience a high 
level of compassion and distress (Simon-Thomas et al., 2012). In line with these findings, it 
might be possible that, in the current study, the results could be explained by the fact that the 
emotion of compassion that was triggered through the mindset priming also brought 
participants in a negative mood. 
 Additionally, one important factor that can be influential for helping decisions could 
be the framing of the charitable message. When it comes to individual donations, how to 
frame the message is an important issue since individual donations appear to be the biggest 
separate source of charitable contributions (Chang & Lee, 2009). Donation requests can be 
advertised either by using positive messages or by using negative messages, both types of 
framing being aimed at promoting donations (Chang & Lee, 2010). Research has shown that 
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by using either one of the frames, donations increased compared to using a neutral framing of 
the message (Chang & Lee, 2010). However, research has focused more on the issue of 
which type of message framing valence (negative vs. positive) is more effective (Levin, 
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998). For example, negative messages determine people to feel the need 
to relieve the guilt and responsibility associated with not donating (Chang & Lee, 2009). 
However, recent studies propose that a negative frame could actually backfire (Chang 2007a; 
O’Keefe & Jensen 2007). For example, Chang (2007a) suggested that if people appraise the 
risks as being high, the impact of negative framing could be reduced. The author suggested 
that individuals could become less capable of handling extra negative information. When the 
message is highly charged with negative information, people may think that their potential 
contribution might not make any difference, thus curbing their willingness to donate at all 
(Chang, 2007a). However, for Study 2, the instructions were designed in such a way that 
participants had to donate to charity (see Appendices H and I), not if they wished to donate or 
not donate (in contrast to Study 1), therefore the findings in Study 2 may not have had 
anything to do with the framing of the message. This is mainly because it was focused more 
on participants' decision whom to allocate the donation, and both choices were rather framed 
positively (i.e., focusing on the positive outcomes of either choice; see Appendices H and I). 
However, there is a need for future research to use a negative message frame to see if they 
can find an effect between processing mode and donation allocation choices. 
 
Theoretical contributions and practical implications 
 The present study contributes to the literature on charitable behavior. Normally, 
research on helping decisions has been focused more only on whether people wish to help or 
not help at all (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Slovic et al., 2002, Small et al., 2007), and also 
how much help they are willing to provide (e.g., Dickert et al., 2011) or who will be the 
target that received the aid (e.g., Friedrich & McGuire, 2010; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b, 
2007). However, this study incorporated all these decisions in one full model and provided 
additional documentation on how people make these decisions. Additionally, the findings that 
emotional reactions are weakened by thinking deliberately provides further evidence for the 
dual-process models in which deliberation operatives as a supervisor by controlling and 
debiasing emotional reactions (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sunstein, 2005). 
 Furthermore, these results could be of great importance for social welfare in the sense 
that a deliberative mode of processing could actually debias people from giving to the 
identified/determined victims and instead switch their aid to statistical victims. This is in line 
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with the utilitarian point of view, of maximizing the utility of giving by helping more people 
who are in greater need. And even more, a deliberative processing mode might come in aid 
for the framing of the message in an abstract, less vivid manner, since deliberation is in 
essence a process that promotes an abstract and less concrete thinking. As a result, this two-
step model would prove itself useful when it comes to how charities will make use of 
people's informational processing modes when it comes to asking for a charitable 
contribution, but also when framing the charitable message. 
    
Limitations and future directions 
 The current study was designed to investigate the function of informational 
processing on individuals' donation decisions. 
 Nonetheless, the study comes with a series of limitations. One of these limitations 
would be the lack of control group. Although previous research made use of a control group 
(Dickert et al., 2011), due to time constraints, it was felt that it was best to compare and 
contrast only intuitive processing mode and deliberative processing mode, since this was the 
main research question. Consequently, the differences found in the study were between the 
groups primed with emotion and those primed with deliberation and their subsequent 
decisions (regarding helping or not helping and whom to allocate the help). It might have 
been beneficial if there had been a third group that operated as a control, in which 
participants had received a handwriting task that had been neutral and had not influenced 
their processing mode and then they had been instructed, in the first study, to decide whether 
they would help or not help or, in the second study, to decide whom to allocate the help. As a 
result, it would have been able to make the distinction between processing modes and helping 
decisions more clear. Thus, future studies could include a control group in order to optimize 
these findings.  
 Another limitation would be the generalizability of the findings. First and foremost, 
the study was conducted in Sweden on a Swedish-speaking population and even though there 
is no reason to believe that the present findings would not be found in samples consisting of 
individuals from other countries and in another language, future studies could explore 
whether these effects still hold in that case. Furthermore, the sample that was used consisted 
of students, thus making it necessary for future research to test these effects on samples with 
other demographics and also take into consideration other factors such as, for example, the 
age, church participation, educational level, the degree of urbanization and financial status of 
the donators (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; 
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Piliavin & Charng, 1990; Smith, 1994; Wilson, 2000; Wunderink, 2002). 
 In addition to the aforementioned limitations, another limitation would be the lack of 
a pilot study testing whether the choices in Study 2 were actually in the realm of either 
intuitition or deliberation. More precisely, if, for Study 2a, MinStoraDag would actually be 
considered, in general, as a more intuitive (or deontological) choice and 
Världsinfektionsfonden would actually be considered more as a deliberative (or utilitarian) 
choice. Analogously, for Study 2b, the same question remains: was the Support area of the 
organization Barncancerfonden more of a intuitive choice and the Research area of the same 
organization more of a deliberative/rational choice? Due to time constraints, the only pilot 
study conducted was concerned around the appropiateness of the questionnaire regarding the 
layout and completion time. This is also a vital matter since the results of Study 2b did not 
yield any differences in choices between people primed emotion compared to those primed 
with deliberation. It could very possibly be that maybe participants themselves could have 
not seen the Support area of Barncancerfonden as appealing more to feelings and that the 
Research area was appealing more to a deliberative, rational thinking. Consequently, future 
studies should conduct a pilot study with a sample of participants different to the ones used in 
the main study in order to examine their ratings of whether the two types of choices match 
the author's intuitive vs. rational choice operalization. If it indeed matches, then the 
explanation for not finding any effect in Study 2b lays on other factors that could, 
nevertheless be dependent on the description of the two choices, such as, for example, the 
framing of the message.  
 
Conclusion 
 The findings of this paper document further evidence that informational processing 
plays an important part in donating decisions. More precisely, whereas an emotional 
processing mode might come in aid when people decide whether to donate or not donate at 
all, the same affective processing might lead the further decision whom to allocate the 
resources to on the ''wrong'' path (i.e., the less normatively correct, from an utilitarian 
perspective). However, a rational processing mode could be the factor that can direct people's 
allocation decision in the righteous direction. The implications for these findings could be 
notable and promising for charities in making the most efficient use of people's situational 
information processing when framing the donation request both when appealing to their 
willingness to donate, but also when requesting their monetary donations to certain causes 
that might have a potentially more powerful impact (i.e., helping a higher number of people 
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that are in greater and more vital need to be helped).  
 There are several significant directions for future work. Exploring the role of 
informational processing in a more complete model of donating decisons could provide a 
valuable framework to help guide future studies in both theoretical and practical endeavors. It 
is hoped that future research can provide further details about how emotion vs. deliberation 
intertwine in influencing decision-making in helping situations and, in doing so, providing 
the theoretical underpinnings for philanthropic organizations to make use of this causal 
relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   39	  
References 
Abbate, C. S., Ruggieri, S., & Boca, S. (2013). Automatic Influences of Priming on Prosocial 
Behavior. Europe's Journal of Psychology, 9(3), 479–492, doi:10.5964/ejop.v9i3.603 
Anik, L., Aknin, L. B., Norton, M. I., & Dunn, E. W. (2009). Feeling good about giving: The  
benefits (and costs) of self-interested charitable behavior. In D. M. Oppenheimer & 
C.Y. Olivola (Eds.), Experimental approaches to the study of charitable giving (pp. 
3–14). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), 
Handbook of social cognition (pp. 1–40). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L., (2000). The mind in the middle: A practical guide to 
priming and automaticity research. In H. T. Reis & C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of 
research methods in social and personality psychology (pp. 253–285). New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects 
of trait construct and stereotype priming on action. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 71(2), 230–244. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.230 
Bargh, J. A., & Pietromonaco, P. (1982). Automatic information processing and social 
perception: The influence of trait information presented outside of conscious 
awareness on impression formation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
43, 437–449. 
Bartels, D. M. (2008). Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and 
decision making. Cognition, 108(2), 381–417. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.001 
Bartels, D. M., & Burnett, R. C. (2011). A group construal account of drop-in-the-bucket 
thinking in policy preference and moral judgment. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 47(1), 50–57. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.08.003 
Batson, C. D. (1987). Prosocial motivation: Is it ever truly altruistic? Advanced Experimental 
Social Psychology, 20, 65–122. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60412-8 
Batson, C. D. (1990). How social an animal? The human capacity for caring. American 
Psychologist, 45(3), 336– 346. 
Batson, C. D. (1991). The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-psychological Answer. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Batson, C. D. (1998).  Altruism and prosocial behavior.  In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske & G. Lindzey 
(Eds.), The handbook of social psychology, 4th edition (Vol. 2, pp. 282–316). New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   40	  
Batson, C. D., Batson, J. G., Griffitt, C. A., Barrientos, S., Brandt, J. R., Sprengelmeyer, P., 
& Bayly, M. J. (1989). Negative-state relief and the empathy altruism hypothesis. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(6), 922– 933. 
Batson, C. D., Batson, J. G., Todd, R. M., Brummett, B. H., Shaw, L. L., & Aldeguer, C. M. 
R. (1995). Empathy and the collective good: Caring for one of the others in a social 
dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68(4), 619–631. doi:	  
10.1037/0022-3514.68.4.619 
Batson, C. D., Early, S., & Salvarani, G. (1997). Perspective taking: Imagining how another 
feels versus imagining how you would feel. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 23(7), 751–758. doi:10.1177/0146167297237008 
Batson, C. D., Lishner, D. A., Carpenter, A., Dulin, L., Harjusola-Webb, S., Stocks, E. L., et 
al. (2003). “. . .As you would have them do unto you”: Does imagining yourself in 
the other’s place stimulate moral action? Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 29, 1190–1201. 
Batson, C. D., O'Quin, K., Fultz, J., Vanderplas, M., & Isen, A. M. (1983). Influence of self-
reported distress and empathy on egoistic versus altruistic motivation to help. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(3), 706-718. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.45.3.706 
Batson, C. D., & Shaw, L. L. (1991). Encouraging words concerning the evidence for 
altruism. Psychological Enquiry, 29(2), 159–168. 
doi:10.1207/s15327965pli0202_17 
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011). A literature review of empirical studies of philanthropy 
eight mechanisms that drive charitable giving. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 40(5), 924–973. doi:10.1177/0899764010380927 
Belkin, L. (1995, July 23). Death on the CNN curve. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/23/magazine/death-on-the-cnn-curve.html. 
Björklund, F., & Backström, M. (2008). Individual differences in processing styles: validity 
of the Rational-Experiential Inventory. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 49, 439–
446. 
Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. New York, 
NY: Guilford Press. 
Chang, C. (2007a). Interactive effects of message framing, product perceived risk, and mood 
– the case of travel healthcare product advertising. Journal of Advertising Research, 
47(1), 51–65. 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   41	  
Chang, C. T., & Lee, Y. K. (2009). Framing Charity Advertising: Influences of Message 
Framing, Image Valence, and Temporal Framing on a Charitable Appeal. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 39(12), 2910–2935. doi:	  10.1111/j.1559-
1816.2009.00555.x 
Chang, C. T., & Lee, Y. K. (2010). Effects of Message Framing, Vividness Congruency and 
Statistical Framing on Responses to Charity Advertising International Journal of 
Advertising, 29(2), 195–220. doi:	  10.1111/j.1559-1816.2009.00555.x 
Coke, J. S., Batson, C. D., & McDavis, K. (1978). Empathic mediation of helping: A two-
stage model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(7), 752–766. doi:	  
10.1037/0022-3514.36.7.752 
Condon, P., & Feldman Barrett, L. (2013). Conceptualizing and experiencing compassion. 
Emotion, 13(5), 817-821. doi:10.1037/a0033747 
Cryder, C. E., Loewenstein, G., & Scheines, R. (2013). The donor is in the details. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120(1), 15–23. doi: 
10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.08.00 
Cushman, F., Young, L., & Greene, J. D. (2010). Multi-system moral psychology. In J. Doris, 
G. Harman, S. Nichols, J. Prinz, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, & S. Stich (Eds.), The Oxford 
handbook of moral psychology (pp. 47–71). Oxford, England: Oxford University 
Press. 
Davis, M. H. (1994). Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Denis, L. (2008). Kant and Hume on Morality. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/kant-hume-morality 
Dickert, S., Sagara, N., & Slovic, P. (2011). Affective motivations to help others: A two stage 
model of donation decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 24(4), 361–
376. doi:10.1002/bdm.697 
Dijksterhuis, A., & van Knippenberg, A. (1998). The relation between perception and 
behavior, or how to win a game of Trivial Pursuit. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74(4), 865–877. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.4.865 
Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., Validzic, A., Motoka, K., Johnson, B., & Frazier, S. (1997). 
Extending the Benefits of Recategorization: Evaluations, Self-Disclosure, and 
Helping. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33(4), 401–420. 
doi:10.1006/jesp.1997.1327 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   42	  
Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., Gaertner, S., Schroeder, D. A., & Clark III, R. D. (1991). The 
arousal: Cost-reward model and the process of intervention: A review of the 
evidence. In M. Clark (Ed.), Prosocial behavior. Review of Personality and Social 
Psychology (Vol. 12, pp. 86–118). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial and related 
behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101(1), 91–119. 
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (1999). Just going along: Nonconscious priming and conformity to 
social pressure. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35(6), 578–589. 
doi:10.1006/jesp.1999.1390 
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious. 
American Psychologist, 49(8), 709–724. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.49.8.709 
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive-
experiential and analytical–rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 71(2), 390–405. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2003). In two minds: dual-process accounts for reasoning. Trends in 
Cognitive Science, 7(10), 454–459. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social 
cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255–278. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629. 
Feinberg, M., Willer, R., Antonenko, O., & John, O. P. (2012). Liberating Reason From the 
Passions Overriding Intuitionist Moral Judgments Through Emotion Reappraisal. 
Psychological science, 23(7), 788-795. doi:10.1177/0956797611434747 
Fetherstonhaugh, D., Slovic, P., Johnson, S. M., & Friedrich, J. (1997). Insensitivity to the 
value of human life: A study of psychophysical numbing. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 14(3), 283–300. 
Friedrich, J., & McGuire, A. (2010). Individual differences in reasoning style as a moderator 
of the identifiable victim effect. Social Influence, 5(3), 182–201. 
doi:10.1080/15534511003707352 
Fultz, J., Schaller, M., & Cialdini, R. B. (1988). Empathy, sadness, and distress: Three related 
but distinct vicarious affective responses to another's suffering. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 14(2), 312–325. doi: 10.1177/0146167288142009 
Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85(3), 453–466. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.3.453 
Garcia, S. M., Weaver, K., Moskowitz, G. B., & Darley, J. M. (2002). Crowded minds: The 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   43	  
implicit bystander effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(4), 843–
853. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.4.843 
Greene, J. D. (2008). The secret joke of Kant's soul Moral psychology, Vol 3: The 
neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain disorders, and development. (pp. 35–80): 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Greene, J., Morelli, S., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive load 
selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 107, 1144–1154. 
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural 
bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron,  44(2), 389–400. 
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An 
fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), 
2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to 
moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814–834. 
doi:10.1037//0033295X.108.4.814 
Hare, R. M. (1981). Moral thinking: Its levels, method, and point. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience. In E. 
T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic 
principles (pp. 133–168). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Higgins, E. T., & King, G. (1981). Accessibility of social constructs: Information processing 
consequences of individual and contextual variability. In N. Cantor & J. Kihlstrom 
(Eds.), Personality, cognition, and social interaction (pp. 69–121). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Horberg, E. J., Oveis, C., & Keltner, D. (2011). Emotions as moral amplifiers: An appraisal 
tendency approach to the influences of distinct emotions upon moral judgment. 
Emotion Review, 3(3), 237–244. doi:10.1177/1754073911402384 
Hornstein, H. A. (1976). Cruelty and kindness: A new look at aggression and altruism. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Hsee, C. K., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2004). Music, pandas, and muggers: on the affective 
psychology of value. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133(1), 23–30. 
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.133.1.23 
Huber, M., Van Boven, L., McGraw, A. P., & Johnson-Graham, L. (2011). Whom to help? 
Immediacy bias in judgments and decisions about humanitarian aid. Organizational 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   44	  
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115(2), 283–293. doi: 
10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.03.003 
Isen, A. M., Shalker, T. E., Clark, M., & Karp, L. (1978). Affect, accessibility of material in 
memory, and behavior: A cognitive loop? Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 36(1), 1–12. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.36.1.1 
Kagan, S. (1998). Normative ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview press. 
Kahneman, D. (1982). On the study of statistical intuitions. Cognition, 11(2), 123–141. 
doi:10.1016/0010-0277(82)90022-1 
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002).Representativeness revisited: attribute substitution in 
intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (pp. 49–81). New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Kant, I. (1959). Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 
Keltner, D., & Lerner, J. S. (2010). Emotion. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindsay 
(Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (pp. 317–352). New York, NY: Wiley. 
Kogut, T., & Ritov, I. (2005a). The "Identified Victim" Effect: An Identified Group, or Just a 
Single Individual? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 157–167. 
doi:10.1002/bdm.492 
Kogut, T., & Ritov, I. (2005b). The singularity effect of identified victims in separate and 
joint evaluations. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97, 
106−116. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp. 2005.02.003. 
Kogut, T., & Ritov, I. (2007). “One of us”: Outstanding willingness to help save a single 
identified compatriot. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
104(2), 150−157. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp. 2007.04.006. 
Lamy, L., Fischer-Lokou, J., & Guéguen, N. (2012). Priming emotion concepnts and helping 
behavior: How unlived emotions can influence action. Social Behavior and 
Personality: An International Journal, 40(1), 55–62. doi:10.2224/sbp.2012.40.1.55 
Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn’t he help? New 
York, NY: Meredith. 
Lazarus, R. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., & Gaeth, G. J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: A 
typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior and 
Health Decision Processes, 76(2), 149–188 doi:	  doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2804 
Li, M., Vietri, J., Galvani, A. P., & Chapman, G. B. (2010). How do people value life? 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   45	  
Psychological Science, 21(2), 163–167. doi:10.1177/0956797609357707 
Lichtenstein, S. & Slovic, P. (2006). The construction of preference. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Loewenstein, G., & Small, D. A. (2007). The Scarecrow and the Tin Man: The vicissitudes of 
human sympathy and caring. Review of General Psychology, 11(2), 112–126. doi: 
10.1037/1089-2680.11.2.112 
Loewenstein, G., Weber, E., Hsee, C., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. Psychological 
Bulletin, 127(7), 267–286. 
Mill, J. S. (1998). Utilitarianism. R. Crisp (Ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Neely, J. H. (1977). Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: Roles of 
inhibitionless spreading activation and limited-capacity attention. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 106(3), 226–254. 
Oceja, L. (2008). Overcoming Empathy-Induced Partiality: Two Rules of Thumb. Basic and 
Applied Social Psychology, 30(2), 176–182. doi:10.1080/01973530802209236 
O’Keefe, D. J., & Jensen, J. D. (2007). The relative persuasiveness of gain-framed and loss-
framed messages for encouraging disease prevention behaviors: a meta-analytic 
review. Journal of Health Communication: International Perspectives, 12(7), 623–
644. doi:0.1080/10810730701615198 
Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information 
processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 972–987. 
Payne, J., Bettman, J., & Johnson, E. (1992). Behavioral decision research: A constructive 
processing perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 87–131. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.43.020192.000511 
Payne, J., Bettman, J., & Johnson, E. (1993). The adaptive decision maker. New York, NY: 
Cambridge. 
Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial behavior: 
multilevel perspectives. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 365–392. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–
205). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Piliavin, J. A., & Charng, H. -W. (1990). Altruism: a review of recent theory and research. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 16, 27–65. 
Piliavin, J. A., Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Clark, R. D. (1981). Emergency Intervention. 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   46	  
New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Piliavin, I. M., Rodin, J., & Piliavin, J. (1969). Good Samaritanism: An underground 
phenomenon? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13(4), 289–299. 
doi:10.1037/h0028433 
Rubaltelli, E., & Agnoli, S. (2011). The emotional cost of charitable donations. Cognition & 
Emotion, 26(5), 769–785. doi:10.1080/02699931.2011.613921 
Shaver, P., Schwartz, J., Kirson, D., & O’Connor, C. (1987). Emotion knowledge: Further 
explorations of a prototype approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
52(6), 1061–1086. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.52.6.1061 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Feelings and phenomenal experiences. In E. T. Higgins 
& A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 
433–465). New York: Guilford Press. 
Simon-Thomas, E. R., Godzik, J., Castle, E., Antonenko, O., Ponz, A., Kogan, A., & Keltner, 
D. (2012). An fMRI study of caring vs. self-focus during induced compassion and 
pride. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(6), 635–648. 
doi:10.1093/scan/nsr045 
Singer, P. (1972). Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(3), 229–
243. 
Singer, P. (2009). The life you can save: How to do your part to end world poverty. New 
York, NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks. 
Slovic, P. (1995). The construction of preference. American Psychologist, 50(5), 364–371. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.50.5.364 
Slovic, P. (2007). "If I look at the mass I will never act": Psychic numbing and genocide. 
Judgment and Decision Making, 2(2), 79–95. 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E. R., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002). The affect heuristic. In 
T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The 
psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 397–420). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1968). Relative importance of probabilities and payoffs in risk 
taking. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 78(3), 1–18. doi:10.1037/h0026468 
Small, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2003). Helping the victim or helping a victim: Altruism 
and identifiability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26(1), 5–16. 
Small, D. A., Loewenstein, G., & Slovic, P. (2007). Sympathy and callousness: The impact 
of deliberative thought on donations to identifiable and statistical victims. 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   47	  
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 102, 143–153. 
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.01.005. 
Smith, D. H. (1994). Determinants of voluntary association participation and volunteering: a 
literature review. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 23(3), 243–263. 
Soyer, E., & Hogarth, R. M. (2011). The size and distribution of donations: Effects of 
number of recipients. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(7), 616–628. 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for 
the rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(5), 645–726. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X00003435 
Sunstein, C. R. (2005). Moral heuristics. Brain and Behavioral Science, 28(4), 531–573. doi: 
10.1017/S0140525X05400096 
Unger, P. K. (1996). Living high and letting die: Our illusion of innocence. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
UNICEF (2009). Child development and survival. Retrieved from 
http://www.unicef.org/childsurvival/ 
Wilson, J. (2000). Volunteering. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(1), 215–240. 
Wilson, T. D., & Capitman, J. A. (1982). Effects of script availability on social behavior. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8(1), 11–19. 
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of dual attitudes. 
Psychological Review, 107(1), 101–126. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.107.1.101 
Wunderink, S. R. (2002). Individual financial donations to charities in The Netherlands: 
Why, how and how much? Journal of Nonprofit and Public Sector Marketing, 10(2), 
21–39. doi:10.1300/J054v10n02_02 
Yan, A. (2008). Explorations in the role of emotion in moral judgment. Proceedings of World 
Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, 30, 404–408.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMOTION	  VS.	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  HELPING	  	   48	  
Appendix A 
Emotion mindset condition in Study 1a and Study 2 
 
Tidigare forskning har visat att de personliga egenskaperna i handstilen framkommer 
tydligast när den som skriver är känslomässigt berörd av något och upplever starka 
emotioner riktade mot någon annan. 
Vi vill därför att du tänker på en situation i ditt liv då du kände stark medkänsla för 
någon annan levande varelse. Beskriv situationen och försök sätta ord på de känslor du 
upplevde. Skriv 30-60 ord.   
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Appendix B 
Emotion conceptual condition in Study 1b 
 
I denna studie så undersöker vi kopplingen mellan handstil, sinnesstämning och personlighet. 
Din uppgift är att transkribera (kopiera) textstycket nedan.  	  
Skriv följande textstycke för hand. 
Compassion is the feeling of empathy for others. The etymology 
of "compassion" is Latin, meaning "co-suffering." Compassion 
commonly gives rise to an active desire to alleviate another's 
suffering. Compassion is considered in almost all traditions 
as amongst the greatest of virtues. 	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Appendix C 
Rationality mindset condition in Study 1a and Study 2 
 
Tidigare forskning har visat att de personliga egenskaperna i handstilen framkommer 
tydligast när den som skriver tänker väldigt objektivt och inte blandar in sina egna 
känslor för mycket. Vi vill därför att du med egna ord beskriver hur du kommer fram 
till svaret på följande fråga (skriv fullständiga meningar). A) En restaurangnota består 
av följande: 132,50 kr för förrätt, 280,50 kr för huvudrätt och 87 kr för efterrätt, plus 
15 % moms. Hur stor blir den totala notan? Skriv 30-60 ord.  
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Appendix D 
Rationality conceptual condition in Study 1a 
 
I denna studie så undersöker vi kopplingen mellan handstil, sinnesstämning och personlighet. 
Din uppgift är att transkribera (kopiera) textstycket nedan.  	  
Skriv följande textstycke för hand. 
Rationality is the quality or state of being reasonable, based 
on facts or reason. A rational decision is one that is not 
just reasoned, but is also optimal for achieving a goal or 
solving a problem. Rationality is considered in almost all 
traditions as amongst the greatest of virtues. 	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Appendix E 
Money allocation task for all conditions in Study 1 
 
Vänta minst en minut innan du vänder blad för att  
fylla i ett kort personlighetstest.  
Detta därför att det är viktigt med en liten paus mellan de olika momenten.  
Läs följande information och svara på frågorna medan du väntar. 
 
  
 
Som tack för din medverkan så deltar du i en utlottning där en person vinner 500kr.  
Vinnaren blir kontaktad via e-mail och får 500kr insatta på sitt konto.  
Tänk dig nu att just du skulle vinna 500kr. Uppskatta hur mycket pengar du tror att du skulle 
vara villig att spendera på följande saker. Skriv antal kronor efter varje typ av spendering. 
Summan ska bli 500kr 
 
1. Grundläggande behov (t.ex. mat, vardagskläder)____________ kr 
2. Nöjen (t.ex. resor, fester)________________ kr 
3. Välgörenhet (skänka bort till bättre behövande)______________________ kr 	  
	  
	  
	  
• Ringa	  in	  ditt	  biologiska	  kön	  	   Man	  	   	   Kvinna	  	  
• Skriv	  din	  nuvarande	  ålder	  	   ___________________________år	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Manipulation check, filler questions and personality items for all conditions 
	  
• Svara	  först	  på	  i	  vilken	  grad	  du	  kände	  följande	  sinnestämningar	  när	  du	  skrev	  
texten	  för	  hand.	  
	   Inte	  Alls	   	   	   	   Väldigt	  mycket	  
Uttråkad	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
Känslosam	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
Analytisk	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
Glad	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
Godhjärtad	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
Beräknande	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
	  
• Svara	  på	  följande	  frågor	  genom	  att	  ringa	  in	  den	  siffra	  som	  bäst	  representerar	  
ditt	  svar.	  Jag	  tycker	  att	  min	  handstil	  är	  lättläst	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  Stämmer	  inte	  alls	   	   	   	   Stämmer	  fullständigt	  	  Jag	  tycker	  att	  min	  handstil	  är	  vacker	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  Stämmer	  inte	  alls	   	   	   	   Stämmer	  fullständigt	  	  Jag	  tycker	  om	  problem	  som	  kräver	  hårt	  tankearbete	  	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  Stämmer	  inte	  alls	   	   	   	   Stämmer	  fullständigt	  	  Jag	  tenderar	  att	  använda	  hjärtat	  som	  vägledare	  för	  mina	  handlingar	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  Stämmer	  inte	  alls	   	   	   	   Stämmer	  fullständigt	  	  Jag	  har	  sinne	  för	  logik	  	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  Stämmer	  inte	  alls	   	   	   	   Stämmer	  fullständigt	  	  Att	  använda	  mina	  instinkter	  brukar	  fungera	  väl	  för	  mig	  vid	  hantering	  av	  problem	  i	  mitt	  liv	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  Stämmer	  inte	  alls	   	   	   	   Stämmer	  fullständigt	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Appendix G 
Funnel debriefing questions 
 
1. Vad tror du att syftet med denna studie var? 
2. Upplevde du att någon av uppgifterna hade något samband med varandra? 
a. Om'' ja'', vilka uppgifter och vilket typ av samband? 
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Appendix H 
Organization choice in Study 2a 
Vänta minst en minut innan du vänder blad för att  
fylla i ett kort personlighetstest.  
Detta därför att det är viktigt med en liten paus mellan de olika momenten.  
Läs därför följande information och svara på frågorna medan du väntar. 
 
Som tack för din medverkan så skänks 10kr till välgörenhet av oss.  Du kan välja till vilken 
av de två organisationerna nedan som du vill skänka dina pengar.  
Ge pengarna till den organisation som du tycker känns bäst.
 
MinStoraDag är en insamlingsstiftelse som hjälper barn med svåra sjukdomar att 
förverkliga sina önskedrömmar. MinStoraDags mål är att ge dessa barn någonting 
underbart att drömma om när dagarna är långa och behandlingarna tuffa.  
 
I barns fantasi kan allting hända. Att sjunga med sin idol, att simma med delfiner, att 
träffa en fotbollsspelare, att åka på semester med sin familj eller att få bjuda vänner på 
kalas är bara några exempel på önskedrömmar som under åren blivit förverkligade 
tack vare MinStoraDags verksamhet. 	  Insamlingsstiftelsen Världsinfektionsfonden har bildats av forskare 
och frivilliga krafter i syfte att stödja forskning och utveckling 
kring fattigdomens infektionssjukdomar, men också att bidra till 
ökad kunskap om dessa sjukdomars inverkan på de fattiga samhällena. 
Världsinfektionsfonden ska med stor flexibilitet och effektivitet 
stödja utvecklingen av medel och metoder för att bekämpa 
infektionssjukdomar. Världsinfektionsfonden bygger sitt agerande på 
sakliga och vetenskapliga grunder och vill vara en naturlig partner för media, 
intresseorganisationer och andra som söker oberoende information om 
infektionssjukdomar och deras effekter på utvecklingsländer.	  
	  
	  
• Ringa	  in	  den	  välgörenhetsorganisation	  som	  du	  vill	  skänka	  10kr	  till	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Appendix I 
Money allocation choice in Study 2b 
Vänta minst en minut innan du vänder blad för att  
fylla i ett kort personlighetstest.  
Detta därför att det är viktigt med en liten paus mellan de olika momenten.  
Läs därför följande information och svara på frågorna medan du väntar. 
 
 
Som tack för din medverkan så skänks 10kr till Barncancerfonden av oss.  
Barncancerfonden jobbar inom de tre områden som står listade nedan. Du kan välja till vilken 
av nedanstående områdena du vill ge dina 10kr.  
 
1. Råd och stöd 
Barncancerfonden bidrar till utveckling av barncancervården för att stödja 
barnet och dess omgivning under och efter behandling. Detta innebär att det 
sjuka barnet kan göra roliga aktiviteter och att familjen får tröst och 
ekonomiskt stöd.  
2. Forskning och utbildning 
Barncancerfonden stöder forskning som har relevans för barncancer. Tre 
oberoende forskningsnämnder avgör vilka forskningsprojekt som ska stödjas. 
3. Information 
Barncancerfonden bedriver informationsverksamhet om barncancer i syfte att 
öka förståelsen för cancersjuka barns livssituation.  
	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
